

論文の内容の要旨

農 学 国 際 専 攻

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氏名 モハメッド アブラル ジュハル

指導教員名 井上真

論文題目 Decentralized Forest Governance in Oromia, Ethiopia: A comparison among
deconcentration, delegation and devolution

(エチオピア・オロミアにおける分権型森林ガバナンス : deconcentration, delegation,
devolution の比較)

Introduction

Tropical deforestation and rural poverty are among the major apprehension of developing nations in the 21st century. The protectionist paradigm that had dominated nature conservation since the 19th century is replaced by a strong notion that poverty reduction and environmental protection should go hand in hand. Decentralization is among the key policies devised to achieve such dual objectives of forest governance. It has also been a pivotal forest policy in Ethiopia since 1991 when the current regime took power. The policy aimed at addressing the two key problems of the country - mitigating the ongoing alarming deforestation and forest degradation as well as contributes to poverty alleviation. Despite being crucial policy for the country, there was scarcity of studies conducted to analytically characterize the decentralization policy, to compare an extent of democratization achieved in different forms of decentralization, and to clarify the social and environmental outcomes from them.

Objectives

The study aimed to fill the aforementioned insufficiency empirically as well as theoretically in the study on decentralized forest governance with the following four objectives: to construct a modified actor-power-accountability framework to atone for drawbacks of the original framework developed by Agrawal and Ribot in 1999; to analytically characterize and assess an extent of democratization in different forms of decentralized forest governance in Ethiopia; to investigate local level social and environmental outcomes from different forms of decentralization; and to draw policy implication to improve forest policy of Ethiopia.

Research Approach

Multiple cases with embedded units design is used for the study. Case study is preferred for the study because of its numerous advantages including ability to utilize qualitative and quantitative data; applicability when the research relies on multiple sources of evidence, when the context cannot be separated from the subject, and when the study benefit from prior development of theoretical proposition to guide data collection and analysis etc. Multiple cases over single case is preferred as the key topic of the study is analysis and comparison of outputs and outcome from three forms of decentralization.

Analytical framework: Modified actor-power-accountability framework

The actor- power- accountability framework developed by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) has been one of the most influential tools in analyzing decentralized forest governance. Despite being one of the most extensively used analytical tool, the framework failed to give sufficient attention to shift in property right due to decentralization and largely neglected to link an extent of democratization with outcomes from decentralization. This study constructed a modified framework to atone for the aforementioned shortcomings. The modified framework assesses the extent of democratization, which is defined as transfer of decision making power to local people or lower level leaders that are accountable to the grassroots, by investigating (1) the actor involved, (2) decision making power on rule making, implementation and adjudication of three major property rights on the forest i.e., management, exclusion and withdraw right, and (3) accountability mechanism and direction among these actors. It also links the extent of decentralization with local level social and environmental outcomes from the decentralization reform. The framework is employed to investigate the extent of democratization as well as local level outcome in Oromia region of Ethiopia, a rarely researched country.

Research sites and data collection

The research is conducted in Oromia regional state where one third of the population as well as about 70% of the forest cover of the country are located. From Oromia region, West Shoa zone is purposively selected for the case study as three major forms of decentralization in Ethiopia, or ‘deconcentration’, ‘devolution’ and ‘delegation’ forms of decentralization, can be seen. Chilimo forest and nearest peasant association Gare Arera containing of Chilimo and Mesalemiya forest cooperative is selected for the study of ‘devolution’. For the study of ‘delegation’, Jibat forest and nearest peasant association Tutu is selected. Both of these forests were previously managed under ‘deconcentration’ type of decentralization before the latest policy reforms. Each of the household in Chilimo, Mesalemiya and Tutu are categorized into four wealth category by using the method of simple wealth ranking.

Data is collected by using document such as policies, proclamations, regulations, agreements etc; archive records such as forest enterprise and forest cooperatives archive on seedling planting, harvesting, job creations etc; semi structured questionnaire; structured questionnaire; and satellite images. A total of fifteen documents as well as thirteen archival records are reviewed to collect qualitative and quantitative data. Open ended, semi structured and structured interview is conducted

with a total of 210 actors/ households. The data on environmental outcome is triangulated with data from satellite imagery analysis. Direct observation is also major source of information throughout the data collection period. Discourse analysis is used to analyze the drivers of decentralization reform. The extent of decentralization is analyzed using pattern matching while cover change analysis of satellite imagery by ArcGIS 10, qualitative analysis and descriptive statistics are used to analyze social and environmental outcomes.

Deconcentration: Management by the lower governments

In deconcentration form of decentralization, decision-making power was transferred to regional and woreda (equivalent to district level) government and their administrative branch; woreda judiciary; and forest guards. The forest guards who were upwardly accountable to woreda administrative office was the only actor who were closer to the local people among the decision makers. Election, or the only mechanism for the local people to make the woreda and regional government be accountable, was found to be weak for three major reasons. Firstly, the election happened once in five years and sometimes it may be skipped at woreda government levels. Secondly, the local people elected representatives in the council among whom the government is elected. Thirdly, the numbers of the people significantly affected by decision on the forest, i.e. people living in and near the forest, are miniature of the total population of woreda. This makes enforcing their voice through election next to impossible.

The earlier stage of deconcentration resulted in indiscriminate destruction of the forest due to insufficient law enforcement during regime transitions. In the latter stage, natural forest recovery continued, particularly in Chilimo, albeit with gradual encroachment into the forest near the boundary to settlements. Forest guarding was poor due to lack of guards' number, insufficient financial incentive, and social opportunity cost of suing community members. Local people had stronger use right on the forest than ever.

Delegation: Managed by parastatal company

In delegation form of decentralization, Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE) made all key decisions through its offices at different levels. There was no pragmatic involvement of lower level actors like peasant associations or local people in the forest governance decision making. Vertical accountability mechanism in delegation is also found to be weak. Horizontal accountability, which is the only possible mechanism to keep decision makers accountable to the grassroots in current condition, is not functioning. Within the enterprise, the lower level offices, i.e. district level bureau, are upwardly accountable to central office.

Delegation did not affect physical capital, the most vital capital for income generation and coping mechanism in Tutu peasant association. Nonetheless, it significantly altered natural capital. Except for use right on non-timber product, the delegation either reduced or completely excluded local people from their key withdrawal rights on the forest. Job creation as well as investment on local development was also found to be minimal. The environmental outcome was positive because planting exceeded harvesting. Lack of incentive to manage the natural forest which is major home for biodiversity as well as the recent decline in proportion of indigenous species panted, however, were

major concern.

Devolution: Management by the local people

The local people and leaders of forest cooperatives (forest user groups) have gained significant discretionary decision making power on management and exclusion rights on the forest as well as withdrawal right on logs for subsistence use and fuelwood for income generation in devolution. For income generation from selling standing volume of plantation and/ or logs, however, they need the blessing of staffs' of woreda natural resource work process or district level staffs of Oromia Forest and Wildlife Enterprise (OFWE). In addition to the power structure, the accountability mechanism was also found to be partially in line with the requirements of democratization. The local people can make their decisions, i.e. leaders of cooperative (FUG) downwardly accountable through periodic evaluation and voting.

Social outcome analysis showed that livelihood strategies based on human capital, physical capital and natural capital are vital as income source as well as coping mechanisms from different vulnerabilities of which draught and associated shortage of food are major one. Of these, natural capital (forest) is salient for the poor community, Chilimo. Within the communities, forest is salient for the poor and very poor wealth categories. The two important physical capitals, i.e. agriculture land and livestock as well as housing, were strengthened in both communities after devolution. Devolution boosted use rights on natural capital, i.e. forest. Benefit sharing from it, nonetheless, privileged political and economic elites at the expense of the poor and very poor who were significantly dependent on the forest. Human capital is also enhanced after devolution through training, albeit the participants in these trainings were also dominated by the political and economic elites. Although the trend in environmental outcome has been good, the recent significant increase in harvesting of the forest for income generation without subsequent increase in planting after OFWE took power is a precaution for the future environmental outcome.

Conclusion and policy implication

Although transfer of meaningful discretionary power to local people or lower-tier governments that are accountable to the populace is a prerequisite to achieve positive outcomes from decentralization, this precondition is realized in none of the three forms of decentralization. However, the devolution form of decentralization is found to be in proximity to the process of democratization.. The delegation and deconcentration form of decentralization reforms shifted the power to middle and higher level actors that are upwardly accountable. The local level social and environmental outcome have shown that achieving positive social and environmental outcome is very complicated and needs more than just achieving democratization. Such complexity that requires thinking beyond democratization is better captured by the modified actor-power-accountability framework created in this study. Restructuring of the existing power and accountability relations from local household to the federal level that also involves bringing new actors into the play ground; creating different incentives to alleviate/ minimize patronage networking, rent seeking etc; setting agreed minimum environmental standards; and selective empowering of the poor and very poor can play significant role in improving outputs and outcomes from each of three forms of decentralization.